Framing Campus Free Expression Conflict Through a Dispute Resolution Optic: Insights For Campus Leaders by Jerry, Robert H., II
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2018 Issue 2 Article 12 
2018 
Framing Campus Free Expression Conflict Through a Dispute 
Resolution Optic: Insights For Campus Leaders 
Robert H. Jerry II 
University of Missouri School of Law, jerryr@missouri.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert H. Jerry II, Framing Campus Free Expression Conflict Through a Dispute Resolution Optic: Insights 
For Campus Leaders, 2018 J. Disp. Resol. (2018) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2018/iss2/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized editor 
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 Framing Campus Free Expression 
Conflict Through a Dispute Resolution 
Optic: Insights For Campus Leaders 
Robert H. Jerry, II* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly four decades of active academic study of dispute resolution processes 
have generated a rich array of insights into conflict management.  This reservoir of 
understanding is more than theory and description; the learning in this field has been 
applied in numerous settings to produce early resolutions, save time and money, 
increase satisfaction and compliance, manage community discord, prevent embry-
onic disputes from escalating into ruinous conflict, and more. This Essay, with cam-
pus leaders as its intended audience (i.e., presidents, chancellors, provosts, deans, 
department chairs, and faculty, staff, and student governance leaders), maintains 
that acquaintance with constructs familiar to dispute resolution scholars and practi-
tioners can deepen understanding of free expression conflict on college campuses, 
increase self-awareness and enhance leaders’ ability to act consciously and purpos-
ively in response to conflict, and help equip campus leaders with useful tools for 
managing conflict when it arises.1  This Essay will stress framing, but many con-
structs in the dispute resolution field illuminate the techniques and skills campus 
leaders need if they are to manage conflict effectively, whatever may be its source. 
II. INSIGHTS FROM MOORE’S CIRCLE OF CONFLICT 
When conflict appears imminent or has erupted, it is important to gather facts 
and determine, to the extent possible, what is driving the conflict, i.e., from what 
sources the conflict derives its energy.  A useful tool for organizing this inquiry is 
Christopher Moore’s “Circle of Conflict.”2  This construct describes the causes of 
conflict in any kind of dispute as five slices of a circular pie – data; structure; rela-
tionships; values; and interests.  These causes can give rise to conflict either indi-
vidually or in any combination of two or more causes.  When a free expression 
conflict arises on campus, trying to understand the underlying causes can be helpful 
                                                        
* Isidor Loeb Professor of Law and Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution, Univer-
sity of Missouri School of Law. The author expresses his thanks to Lyrissa Lidsky for her valuable 
comments on an earlier draft of this Essay. 
 1.  For a more general discussion that applies dispute resolution principles and concepts to conflicts 
that arise on university campuses, see Maria R. Volpe & David Chandler, Resolving Conflicts in Institu-
tions of Higher Education: Challenges for Pracademics (CNCR-Hewlett Foundation Seed Grant White 
Papers, Paper No. 8, 1999), https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https:// 
www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1007&context=seedgrant. 
 2. Christopher W. Moore is a partner in a mediation and conflict resolution consulting and training 
practice located in Colorado. He introduced the Circle of Conflict construct in his book The Mediation 
Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, first published in 1986 and published in its fourth 
edition in 2014. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT (4th ed. 2014). 
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to identifying an approach for responding to and managing it, hopefully toward res-
olution. 
Each of the causes in the Circle has different implications.  Data (or infor-
mation) conflicts occur when information is missing or disagreements exist about 
what known data means. The starting place to resolve data conflicts is transparency, 
i.e., getting all of the data out on the table for discussion.  Data conflicts can result 
from rumors and misinformation; thus, transparency and prompt, full circulation of 
accurate information are important in dealing with data conflicts.  Value conflicts 
are grounded in disputants’ different beliefs, cultures, religions, heritage, and polit-
ical orthodoxies.  Recognizing that a free speech conflict is value-laden is im-
portant, because value-based conflicts are usually among the most difficult kinds of 
conflicts to resolve.  It is usually impossible to persuade disputants to change their 
values, and appreciating this reality is an important first step to dealing with a con-
flict.  Treating value differences like additional data points – and focusing on getting 
these points onto the table in a transparent discussion – can be helpful. 
Structure conflicts are grounded in the ways institutions and relationships are 
organized.  For example, an imbalance of power (e.g., employer versus employee, 
or administrator versus student) may interfere with what one (or both) of the dispu-
tants needs or wants, which leads to conflict.  A deadline or time constraint that 
prevents at least one disputant from fulfilling expectations is another kind of struc-
ture conflict.  Barriers that set up structure conflicts are common in campus envi-
ronments.  If an assessment of a conflict reveals that it may have resulted from or 
been enhanced by a lack of communication because of a structural power imbalance 
(or perceived imbalance), part of the solution could involve setting up information-
sharing and communication-enhancing structures to break down that barrier.  Rela-
tionship conflicts is a category that captures the reality of misunderstandings when-
ever individuals interact.  These kinds of conflicts are among the more difficult to 
resolve because relationship problems frequently become entrenched quickly, and 
it is difficult to convince disputants to acknowledge how their own behaviors have 
contributed to a relationship conflict.  As any campus leader knows, relationship 
conflicts are also common on our university campuses. 
Interest conflicts have their roots in the wants and desires of disputants.  Inter-
ests can be located in the answers to why a disputant wants a particular outcome.  
Sometimes disputants have not articulated or even identified what their interests 
are, so the process of conflict resolution in these instances involves taking some 
steps to help the disputants articulate their goals and the reasons for those goals.  
Focusing on underlying interests lays the groundwork for attempting to reconcile 
competing interests or finding a compromise under which each of the disputants 
gives up a portion of their interests to order to accommodate a mutually agreeable 
solution. 
Jolie Pillsbury3 adds a useful sixth category to Moore’s Circle – language con-
flicts.  This addition recognizes that language conflict is possible whenever words 
                                                        
 3. Jolie B. Pillsbury is the president of a performance consulting company located in Arlington, Vir-
ginia. 
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are used: identical words sometimes have different meanings4 or are interpreted dif-
ferently in context;5 different understandings are often unknown to those using the 
words;6 different cultures give words different meanings;7 and translation chal-
lenges exist whenever different languages are used.8  In addition, behavioral science 
has long taught that it is human nature for listeners to hear meanings other than 
those intended by the speaker.9 
A campus leader who has experienced a significant campus free speech conflict 
can dissect it by using Moore’s Circle to identify the existence, influence, and im-
pact of the various causes of conflict present in the narrative.  This is important and 
useful, but the Circle’s greatest value is found in what it reveals about strategies 
campus leaders might deploy when attempting to manage a free speech dispute.  
Some of these strategies are listed on the following table, which is organized by 
reference to the various categories in Moore’s Circle.10 
 
Type of Conflict Possible Strategies to Deal with the Conflict 
Data 
Explicitly raise and acknowledge missing data and 
points of misunderstanding with respect to availa-
ble data 
Embrace candor and transparency with respect to 
how information was acquired and is being de-
fined, used, and interpreted 
Encourage using the best data available and efforts 
to work collaboratively to get better data 
                                                        
 4. A simple illustration is the word “light,” which may be used correctly to refer to the weight of an 
object or to its illumination characteristics. Two speakers referring to how something is “light” may be 
talking about two completely different ideas without any awareness of the misunderstanding. 
 5. The statement “you don’t understand” may be intended to convey “you heard incorrectly what I 
said, and the data point needs to be corrected,” but may be heard as demeaning the listener’s cognitive 
abilities to comprehend, which is offensive to the listener. 
 6. See, e.g., Raffles v. Wichelhaus [1864], EWHC (Fam) Exch. J19 (contract for sale of cotton to be 
delivered in Liverpool on the ship Peerless arriving from Bombay, but there were two ships arriving 
from Bombay, one in October and one in December; buyer thought the contract referred to the October 
ship, and seller thought it referred to the December ship). 
 7. See, e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 999 (2007); Edgardo Rotman, The Inherent Problems of Legal Translation: Theoret-
ical Aspects, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187 (1995). 
 8. See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Word Commons and Foreign Laws, 46 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 219 
(2013) (explaining how legal words when used across geographic, social, and cultural boundaries have 
limited common meanings); Olivier Cachard, Translating the French Civil Code: Politics, Linguistics, 
and Legislation, 21 CONN. J. INT’L L. 41 (2005) (discussing various complexities involved in translating 
the French Civil Code); Roderick A. MacDonald, Legal Bilingualism, 42 MCGILL L. J. 119 (1997) (dis-
cussing the challenges of a bilingual legal order in Canada). One can argue, however, that translation 
does not depend on the use of two or more languages, but rather occurs in all communication, in the 
sense that every spoken expression must be deciphered by the listener. 
 9. See, e.g., James Marshall, Evidence, Psychology, and the Trial: Some Challenges to Law, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 197 (1963). 
 10. This chart is adapted from CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS 60-61 (1996) 
(describing the “Sphere of Conflict”); Jolie Bain Pillsbury, The Circle of Conflict Adaptation, RESULTS 
BASED LEADERSHIP APPLICATIONS (2015), http://nlc.org/sites/default/files/users/user112/Cir-
cle%20of%20Conflict%20Adaptation.pdf; Sara Rickover, Analyzing the Causes of Disputes with the 
Circle of Conflict, SARA RICKOVER, BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL (May 12, 2014), https://sararicko-
ver.wordpress.com/2014/05/12/analyzing-the-causes-of-disputes-with-the-circle-of-conflict/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2018); 
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Retain third party, perhaps with expertise, to inter-
pret data and break a data conflict impasse 
Values 
Use non-judgmental, empathetic listening tech-
niques when value-laden positions are presented 
If possible, redefine the problem in a way that de-
fines or reframes the issue without reference to the 
value 
Try to identify overarching shared values that pro-
vide a basis for further conversation  
When the limits of shared values are reached, seek 
to forge a shared willingness to accept differences 
in values 
Seek mutual awareness of the premises and per-
sonal experiences that underlie unshared values 
Structure 
Identify the structural sources of conflict, and dis-
cuss roles within the organizational structure, the 
scope of authority in these roles, and the sources 
of authority for these roles 
Discuss strategies to reform or adapt the existing 
structure when the disputants can do so 
Modify physical relationships, locations, and other 
environmental elements within the structure 
When impossible to reform or adapt the structure, 
identify who controls the structure and discuss the 
feasibility of engaging them to make changes (and 
then undertaking this engagement if change is fea-
sible) 
Where the structure is fixed and unalterable, de-
velop options for new ways to interact within the 
structure, such as changing roles within the struc-
ture or reallocating responsibilities 
Relationships 
Identify relationship conflicts, determine when 
and where they occur, and seek shared descrip-
tions of the manners in which these conflicts are 
presented and manifested 
Explore ways disputants can adjust their relation-
ships to enable different manners of interaction, 
including different procedures, ground rules, crea-
tion of expectation of problem-solving attitudes, 
etc.  
Clarify perceptions through increased and better 
quality communications  
Change structure to impede or prevent negative in-
teraction (especially repetitive negative interac-
tion) 
Identify ways to attend to the consequences of re-
lationship conflict through remedy, restoration, 
apology, acquiescence, and/or forgiveness 
4
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Interests 
Identify the actual interests underlying disputants’ 
positions, and who the decision makers are for ar-
ticulating those interests  
Seek to identify standards that enable objective 
evaluation and measurement of interests 
Where interests overlap, develop options that take 
advantage of the overlap; search for ways to iden-
tify more options  
Where interests compete, develop options that ei-
ther reconcile the competing interests or can be im-
plemented through reciprocal concessions leading 
to compromise; identify objective standards for 
measuring the trade-offs 
Language 
Identify language differences, encourage reconcil-
iation of different meanings, and propose shared, 
reliable, and acceptable definitions 
  
III. POSITIONS AND INTERESTS 
The interests category in Moore’s Circle mentions another important dispute 
resolution construct: the distinction between positions and interests.  Positions are 
the stances disputants take and the views they articulate; when taking a position, the 
disputant describes what is sought and requested, usually accompanied by a state-
ment of rationale for the position (as with, for example, the statement of a legal rule 
or principle, or an appeal to a social norm or standard, such as equity, fairness, or 
an ethical ideal).  But what a disputant says is wanted and desired is not equivalent 
to the needs, wants, desires, concerns, and/or fears that motivate taking the posi-
tion.11  The things the disputant actually cares about and which lead one to assert a 
position are interests.  Positions involve the public assertion of a claim; interests are 
the needs, wants, desires, concerns, or fears that underlie the claim. 
Recognizing the difference is a key to solving problems and resolving disputes.  
The process of identifying and assessing legal rights is, of course, important, but 
rights are asserted, and positions are taken based on those assertions, to promote 
interests.  If options are generated and solutions proposed for the purpose of pre-
serving or enhancing interests, a solution is more likely to emerge, and the range of 
available value-enhancing options may actually increase.  Rarely will a disputant 
admit that a position already taken is wrong and then reach an agreed resolution on 
the basis of this admission.  If, however, an option can be promoted that preserves 
or enhances the underlying interests (or is perceived to do so), a solution is more 
likely.  In disputes over free expression, it is unrealistic for a campus leader to ex-
pect a constituency staking out a position in a conflict to abandon its position, but 
appeals or proposals based on interests may be more productive.  In other words, 
                                                        
 11. One of the first descriptions of the position-interest distinction is found in WILLIAM L. URY, 
JEANNE M. BRETT, & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO 
CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 4-8 (1988). 
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identifying a constituency’s interest, and then helping that party understand its in-
terests through non-judgmental discussions, offers the possibility of defusing a con-
flict. 
IV. ADVERSARIAL VERSUS COLLABORATIVE NEGOTIATION 
Negotiation is an extremely common method of dispute resolution, and the ap-
proaches to negotiating a dispute are commonly sorted into adversarial versus col-
laborative styles.12  The adversarial approach emphasizes positions based on rights 
and power, and often proceeds from the premise that a single right (or best) outcome 
exists that is mutually exclusive from alternative outcomes.  The adversarial ap-
proach assumes a zero-sum universe, where only winners and losers exist, and no 
space is available for exploring the possibility of common ground where value-en-
hancing agreements are possible.  The adversarial approach is sometimes described 
as “distributive,” meaning that the dispute unfolds in a zero-sum universe where a 
creative search for other options is pointless, and energy and resources must be 
marshalled toward winning the dispute and defeating opponents.  The collaborative 
style, in contrast, emphasizes the interests of those involved in a dispute, and looks 
first for solutions that respect, protect, and enhance the interests of all sides.  This 
approach does not presume that it is necessary for someone in the dispute to have 
its position rejected and to lose, but rather proceeds on the premise that the dispute 
may not be zero-sum and that “win-win” options may be available.  One seeking to 
problem-solve with this approach gives emphasis to “stepping into the shoes” of 
disputants and understanding their points of view.  Naturally, the collaborative ap-
proach is more supportive of relationships, in contrast to the adversarial approach 
where defeating those who disagree is the goal. 
Whether the adversarial or collaborative approach to negotiation is deployed, 
negotiation (along with interviewing, counseling, and other forms of dispute reso-
lution) stresses the importance of “active listening,”13 a term that describes a com-
munication skill where the listener concentrates, absorbs, responds, retains, and en-
gages in other behaviors that enhance understanding and help resolve conflict.  Ac-
tive listening is arguably the most important of all communication skills, and it re-
quires a focused, conscious effort to show respect, understanding, attention, and, in 
many situations, empathy.14 
                                                        
 12. For a discussion of the different styles of negotiation, see G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR 
ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006). Different vocabular-
ies are used to describe this distinction: adversarial vs. problem-solving, value-claiming vs. value-creat-
ing, distributive vs. integrative, and expanding the pie vs. dividing the pie are common ways to describe 
the continuum of negotiation styles. 
 13. See Neil Hamilton, Effectiveness Requires Listening: How to Assess and Improve Listening Skills, 
13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 145 (2012); Alison Doyle, Learn about Active Listening Skills with Examples, 
THE BALANCE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/active-listening-skills-with-examples-
2059684 (last visited Jan. 26, 2018). 
 14. See William Ury, The power of listening | William Ury | TEDxSanDiego, YOUTUBE (Jan. 7, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=saXfavo1OQo. 
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V. BARRIERS TO RESOLUTION 
Robert Mnookin’s important 1993 article on barriers to conflict resolution15 
presents a conceptual model of negotiation that explains conflict by reference to 
barriers that impede and sometimes prevent dispute resolution.  For example, when 
one negotiator possesses information that the other does not have (i.e., when condi-
tions of “information asymmetry” exist), lack of transparency, bluffing, and misdi-
rection can lead to impasse.  Another example is the “principal-agent problem,” 
where an individual or constituency is represented by another person or an individ-
ual outside the organization, and the agent’s behaviors are based on interests of the 
agent rather than interests of the principal.  This situation might manifest itself 
when, for example, a student group is represented or encouraged by third parties 
who are promoting their own interests. 
One of the most important categories of barriers to resolution are found in the 
empirically demonstrated cognitive biases that affect human decision making, guide 
human behavior, all too often lead to and reinforce conflict, and sometimes prevent 
conflict resolution.16  Some especially important cognitive biases of which the cam-
pus leader seeking to manage conflict should be mindful are: confirmation bias (the 
tendency to search for, interpret, recall, and favor information that confirms preex-
isting beliefs); the bandwagon effect (the tendency to believe things because many 
other people believe the same thing); availability bias (the tendency to base conclu-
sions on a limited sample of recent experiences or on limited information that is 
unusual or emotionally charged); confidence illusion (the tendency of professionals 
conscious of their expertise or experience to overestimate their abilities to evaluate 
situations and/or make good decisions); the continued influence effect (the tendency 
to believe previously learned information after it is demonstrated to be incorrect); 
stereotyping (the tendency to assume that an individual member of a group has cer-
tain characteristics of the group without knowing information about the individual); 
partisan perceptions (the tendency to view evidence with a bias in one’s own favor 
or in support of one’s own point of view); reactive devaluation (the tendency to 
discount the accuracy or usefulness of information or to devalue proposals provided 
by an adversary or someone perceived as an opponent); and satisfaction influence 
(the tendency to be satisfied with the first explanation of an event to the exclusion 
of superior explanations that would be discovered if a search for information were 
continued). 
VI. BACKGROUND LAW AND LEADERSHIP STYLE 
Whenever someone engages in problem-solving or dispute resolution activi-
ties, that person does so against the background of applicable law, or, as a powerful 
                                                        
 15. See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of 
Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 235 (1993). 
 16. See generally JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION AND DECISION MAKING (2013); 
Richard Birke, Neuroscience and Negotiation: What the New Science of Mind May Offer the Practicing 
Attorney, 17 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 4 (2011); Jeremy Lack & François Bogacz, The Neurophysiology of 
ADR and Process Design: A New Approach to Conflict Prevention and Resolution?, 14 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 33 (2012). 
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metaphor puts it, in the “shadow of the law.”17  In other words, when managing free 
speech conflict, campus leaders cannot ignore the requirements of federal and state 
constitutions, applicable statutes and judicial precedents, and the rules created by 
trustees and governing boards that set forth both standards and processes for how 
universities are to be administered.  Occasionally, with respect to governance rules 
and perhaps even applicable statutes, a campus leader might have the option to de-
fuse a conflict by proposing to work with disputants toward mutually acceptable 
legal reforms.  With respect to applicable constitutional principles and judicial prec-
edents, this option is not, as a practical matter, available. 
The applicable law sets the rules of the playing field, but when operating on 
that field, the position-interest and adversarial-collaborative distinctions discussed 
earlier all speak to the demeanor, style, and attitude that a campus leader adopts 
when dealing with free speech conflict. For example, when a campus leader inter-
acts with the leaders of an uninvited, non-university, ultra-right group planning to 
march to and hold a torch-lit, night-time rally on the campus quadrangle, the firm-
ness and assertiveness usually associated with an adversarial approach18 may be 
more appropriate.  When dealing with a student organization planning to protest a 
speaker invited to campus by another student organization, a collaborative style 
may be more appropriate.  In the opinion of this writer, the final chapter in the 
histories of many presidencies, chancellorships, and other senior campus leaders 
was not written because the leader necessarily took substantively incorrect or pa-
tently unreasonable positions, but instead resulted from the projection of inapt de-
meanors, styles, and attitudes in the face of crisis without heeding the lessons that 
can be learned from the academic study of dispute resolution.   
VII. FRAMING 
The field of dispute resolution cannot claim the construct of framing as its own; 
credit for articulation of framing as a theory should probably go to sociologist Erv-
ing Goffman, whose 1974 book Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of 
Experience19 sought to explain how humans organize their perceptions of events 
and experiences, and how these constructs (the “frames”) in turn guide human be-
havior and interactions.  In essence, framing theory posits that how information is 
presented to an audience influences how the recipients of the information process 
it, which influences the meaning attributed to the message.  For at least two decades, 
dispute resolution scholars have used the concept of “framing” to help explain how 
                                                        
 17. This oft-quoted metaphorical phrase became iconic in the dispute resolution field as a result of 
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 18. It is important to note that an adherent to the adversarial approach is necessarily nasty, argumen-
tative, or mean-spirited. The adversarial approach means that the dispute is defined as zero-sum, where 
gains for one negotiator are necessarily losses for the other. One can be adversarial but still be “nice.” 
Russell Korobkin explains that adversarial negotiation presumes treating a dispute as zero-sum, whereas 
collaborative negotiation presumes that it is possible to negotiate with an assumption that joint value 
awaits discovery and allocation in a win-win solution. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal 
Negotiation, 88 GEO. L. J. 1789 (2000). 
 19. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 
(1986). 
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negotiation can be used to resolve conflict,20 but the concept of framing has been 
applied in a variety of fields, including psychology,21 finance,22 journalism,23 com-
munications,24 business management,25 and politics,26 to name only a few.  Story-
telling, for example, is an example of framing: “By placing the facts within the 
context of a narrative with a unifying theme, a specific genre, and persuasive im-
ages, all fashioned for a particular audience, a storyteller seeks to convey a partic-
ular meaning to that audience.”27  In fact, this Essay is itself a frame; a perspective 
for thinking about managing free speech conflict on university campuses is being 
expressed through a dispute resolution frame.  In dealing with conflict, “we create 
frames to help us understand why the conflict exists, what actions are important to 
the conflict, why the parties act as they do, and how we should act in response.  
During the evolution of a conflict, frames act as sieves through which information 
is gathered and analyzed, positions are determined (including priorities, means, and 
solutions), and action plans developed.  Depending on the context, frames may be 
used to conceptualize and interpret, or to manipulate and convince.”28  
Because the contours of free speech law are especially malleable and uncertain, 
the concept of framing is highly relevant to free speech discourse (as it is to many 
other legal rules and concepts).  Justice William Brennan once referred to “the com-
plex of strands in the web of freedoms which make up free speech,”29 and judges 
and scholars have often commented on the challenges presented when applying the 
First Amendment to free speech and expression disputes.30  Thus, campus leaders, 
                                                        
 20. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 163 (2000); Linda L. Putnam & Martha Shoemaker, Changes in Conflict Framing in the News 
Coverage of an Environmental Conflict, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 167; Marcia Caton Campbell & Jayne 
Seminare Docherty, What’s in a Frame? (That Which We Call a Rose by any other Name Would Smell 
as Sweet), 87 MARQ. L. REV. 769 (2004). Careful readers have already noted that this essay uses dispute 
resolution theory as a frame through which campus free speech conflict can be viewed; further, in this 
portion of the essay, dispute resolution theory’s use of framing is itself creating a frame to explicate free 
speech conflict. 
 21. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology 
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981). 
 22. See MICHAEL M. POMPIAN, Framing Bias, in BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND WEALTH 
MANAGEMENT: HOW TO BUILD INVESTMENT STRATEGIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR INVESTOR BIASES 143 
(2012). 
 23. Pew Research Center: Journalism & Media Staff, Framing the News, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: 
JOURNALISM & MEDIA (July 13, 1998), http://www.journalism.org/1998/07/13/framing-the-news/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 24. See Dietram A. Scheufele, Framing as a Theory of Media Effects, 49 J. OF COMMUNICATION 103 
(1999). 
 25. See GAIL T. FAIRHURST, THE POWER OF FRAMING: CREATING THE LANGUAGE OF LEADERSHIP 
(2d ed. 2011). 
 26. See Britta C. Brugman, Christian Burgers & Gerald J. Steen, Recategorizing Political Frames: A 
Systematic Review of Metaphorical Framing in Experiments on Political Communication, 41 ANNALS 
OF THE INT’L COMM. ASS’N 181 (2017), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/ 
10.1080/23808985.2017.1312481; Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 17, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/magazine/the-framing-wars.html?_r=0. 
 27. STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 191 (5th ed. 
2015). 
 28. Sanda Kaufman, Michael Elliott & Deborah Shmueli, Frames, Framing, and Reframing, BEYOND 
INTRACTABILITY (2017), https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/framing (last visited Jan. 14, 
2018). 
 29. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958). 
 30. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (Blackmun, J., referring to “the truly 
difficult issues involving the First Amendment,” in the context of a challenge to a Tennessee statute 
prohibiting solicitation of votes and displays of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance of a 
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almost all of whom do not have professional legal training, should take comfort in 
knowing that they are not alone.  The contributions to this Symposium by Professors 
Post,31 Wells, and Trachtenberg all underscore the varied, sometimes inconsistent, 
and invariably complex interpretations of what the right of free speech entails when 
applied to the infinitely varied fact patterns that can arise on a university campus.  
Moreover, the narratives presented in this Symposium by campus leaders about ex-
periences on their own campuses provide graphic illustrations of how these com-
plexities impact real events. 
That the text of the First Amendment is itself the source of enduring conflict 
is, perhaps, the most important of this Symposium’s lessons for campus leaders 
seeking guidance on how to resolve First Amendment disputes on their campuses.  
This is eloquently explained by Professor Chris Wells in her contribution to this 
Symposium.32  Professor Jud Campbell writes, “[a]fter a century of academic debate 
. . . the meanings of speech and press freedoms at the Founding remain remarkably 
hazy.”33  Multiple positivist theories of the meaning of the First Amendment have 
their adherents;34 the most prominent of these constructs, and the one repeatedly 
favored in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, has its origins in Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes’ famous dissent in which he wrote that “the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas – that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”35 
The campus leader unfamiliar with the vocabulary of free speech jurispru-
dence36 is likely to learn upon a first encounter with a free speech dispute that the 
rules applicable to public and private institutions are different.  As state actors, all 
public universities are legally bound to protect the constitutional rights of their stu-
dents, and thus the protections of the First Amendment apply on public campuses.  
Private universities are not state actors, and because the First Amendment limits 
only government action, a private university is not bound by the First Amendment 
unless its governing board adopts rules that make the principles of the First Amend-
ment applicable on the campus.  Many private universities have done exactly that.  
If the question of applicability is settled in the affirmative, the next questions are 
likely to reveal to the campus leader that seemingly simple, routine questions about 
                                                        
polling place on election day); Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing question sub 
judice as “a most difficult question,” i.e., balancing students’ free speech rights against rights of other 
students to be secure and left alone); Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48, 329 F.3d 1044 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (referring to “the often confusing intersection of First Amendment rights and the delicate 
balance which must be struck by our public schools in insuring the right to Free Speech but avoiding 
endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause”). 
 31. Mizzou Video Production at Academic Support Center, The First Amendment on Campus Sympo-
sium (Oct. 27, 2017), https://livestream.com/accounts/13547932/events/7865962. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 Yale L. J. 246, 246 (2017). 
 34. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1015 (examining 
three normative rationales for free speech in U.S.); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment 
Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2002). 
 35. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 36. Common concepts and terms of art in the law of free speech under the First Amendment include 
“time, place, and manner” restrictions, “content-based” versus “content-neutral” restrictions, “traditional 
public forum,” “low-value” versus “high-value” speech, “prior restraint,” “public concern,” “imminent 
threat,” “fighting words,” “government speech,” and levels of scrutiny (“strict scrutiny”; “intermediate 
scrutiny”; “rational-basis scrutiny”). 
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the First Amendment and its boundaries often lack clear, simple, and straightfor-
ward answers.  Even when advised that a governing, pertinent First Amendment 
doctrine is well settled, the campus leader may discover, in the context of rapidly 
unfolding campus events that need an immediate administrative response, that set-
tled principles are challenged or even repudiated by passionate campus constituen-
cies. 
The predominant frame for First Amendment discourse on campus is currently 
what might be described as libertarian.  This frame, which draws much support 
from the Supreme Court’s current First Amendment jurisprudence, does not assert 
that government cannot regulate speech in any circumstance, but that restrictions 
on expression are permitted only in very limited circumstances, i.e., when the re-
striction is content-neutral and narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling state 
purpose.  This understanding of the First Amendment is the premise of the Univer-
sity of Chicago’s 2015 “Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression,”37 
which has been embraced verbatim or with some modifications on many cam-
puses,38 the positions of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (known 
as “FIRE”),39 statutes enacted by some legislatures,40 and the writings of scholars 
such as Dean Chemerinsky.41  This frame is used to defend the rights of controver-
sial, offensive speakers to appear and speak in public spaces on campuses, rights 
that yield only when a university’s ability to maintain campus safety is incapacitated 
and untenable.  Substantial expense to preserve campus security (i.e., spending hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars) is, under this view, an insufficient rationale to refuse 
to grant a forum to an offensive speaker. 
An alternative frame to explain the First Amendment’s application to campus 
discourse might be described as mission-centric purposiveness.  Professor Post ex-
plains that “universities are not public squares” but are instead “communities” with 
“values connected to learning, to education, [and] to expansion of knowledge,” and 
that these values guide members of a campus community in “how we act, which 
includes in how we speak.”42  Under this view, the First Amendment was created 
                                                        
 37. Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression, UNIV. OF CHICAGO (2015), https://freeex-
pression.uchicago.edu/page/report-committee-freedom-expression (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 38. See, e.g., Commitment to Free Expression, UNIV. OF MO. (2016), https://freespeech.mis-
souri.edu/commitment-to-free-expression/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018);Rights, Rules, Responsibilities, 
1.1.3 Statement on Freedom of Expression, PRINCETON UNIV. (2015), http://www.prince-
ton.edu/pub/rrr/part1/index.xml#comp113 (last visited Jan. 15, 2018);Commitment to Freedom of Ex-
pression, PURDUE UNIV. http://www.purdue.edu/purdue/about/free-speech.html (last visited Jan. 15, 
2018); Regent Policy Doc. 4-21: Commitment to Academic Freedom and Freedom of Expression, Policy 
Statement, UNIV. OF WIS. https://www.wisconsin.edu/regents/policies/commitment-to-academic-free-
dom-and-freedom-of-expression/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 39. See FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018). 
 40. See, e.g., Campus Free Expression Act, MO. REV. STAT. §173.1550 (2015); Campus Free Expres-
sion Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 53B-27-203 (2017); Campus Free Speech Protection Act, TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 49-7-2405 2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-300 et seq. (2017) (requirement that Board of Gover-
nors of University of North Carolina develop and adopt free expression policy with mandated content); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-1865 2016) (free speech may not be limited by community college or university 
in “any area on campus,” subject to “reasonable time, place and manner restrictions”). 
 41. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 20 (2017) (“Our po-
sition is absolute: campuses never can censor or punish the expression of ideas, however offensive, be-
cause otherwise they cannot perform their function of promoting inquiry, discovery, and the dissemina-
tion of new knowledge. Although the First Amendment only applies to public universities, all colleges 
and universities should commit themselves to these values.”). 
 42. Robert Post, The First Amendment on Campus: Identifying Principles for Best Practices for Man-
aging and Resolving Disputes, (Oct. 27, 2017) (The video recording of the Symposium is accessible at 
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“to allow the American people to exercise self-governance,” which does not, in and 
of itself, speak to what a university is, nor does it constrain mission-purposive reg-
ulation of speech within the university, unless we “choose to make it so.”43 
Under the principles of this frame, campus speech can be regulated in ways that 
facilitate the education of students, without regard to what the libertarian frame 
might require.  Inside the classroom, this is not seriously questioned (and the liber-
tarian frame would agree to this extent); an instructor can be required to teach par-
ticular subjects and designated content, and students are not allowed to say whatever 
they want about anything they want.  Content discrimination is allowed; all ideas 
are not equal in the classroom, and compelled speech is normal.  The classroom is 
not the same thing as the public square, where offensive speech is protected.44  A 
state legislature might declare the outdoor areas of a campus a traditional public 
forum (and presumably Congress might constitutionally do the same for universities 
that receive public funds); the libertarian frame would contend that this answer is 
required without regard to legislative pronouncement.  The mission-centric, purpos-
iveness frame accedes to the legislature’s authority to make all open spaces on a 
university campus a public forum, but rejects the proposition that this result is com-
pelled by the First Amendment.  Instead, the community areas of the university 
extend to all its spaces, and under the mission-centric purposiveness frame, the uni-
versity can regulate this space to fulfill the university’s purpose and mission.  Under 
this frame, the university can authorize students to invite speakers only when the 
university’s purposes are served; similarly, an offensive speaker does not have a 
right, even when invited by students, to speak on the university’s premises.  Under 
this frame, a public university is not the equivalent of a public park or plaza, absent 
a legislative statement declaring that to be so.  Thus, under this alternative frame, 
the First Amendment yields different answers to questions about the bounds of free 
speech on campus than the libertarian frame. 
A third frame for explaining how the First Amendment might be applied to 
campus discourse can be described as exception-expansionism.  This frame is ad-
vocated by those who favor hate speech codes, despite the fact that they have been 
struck down consistently in the decided cases,45 and stringent university regulation 
of offensive speech targeted at minority, ethnic, and religious groups.  This frame, 
which more closely resembles speech regulation in European democracies,46 essen-
tially urges that the recognized bases for regulating speech under the First Amend-
ment are drawn too narrowly, and calls for a different balance between the right to 
utter offensive, hateful, or vulgar speech and the right of individuals to be protected 
                                                        
the following link: https://livestream.com/accounts/13547932/events/7865962/videos/165023291, Part 
I., 2:19:05. 
 43. Id. at 2:50:10. 
 44. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The necessities 
of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created [such as a classroom] 
may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”). 
 45. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1252 
(9th Cir. 2006) (“It is well-settled that a hate speech code which ‘prohibits otherwise permitted speech 
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses’ is ‘facially unconstitutional,” citing R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992). 
 46. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, 
Militant Democracy, and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 
TUL. L. REV. 1549 (2004); NPR Staff, Held Dear in U.S., Free Speech Perplexing Abroad, NPR (Sept. 
19, 2012, 5:11 PM) https://www.npr.org/2012/09/19/161439562/held-dear-in-u-s-free-speech-perplex-
ing-abroad (last visited Jan. 15 2018). 
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from such speech in public spaces.47  This frame embraces the view that equality in 
the exercise of the rights of citizenship is a fundamental constitutional value, and 
no right, including the right to free speech, can “encompass invective that implicitly 
or explicitly denies the equal citizenship of some members of the American com-
munity.”48  In contrast, the libertarian frame urges that while campus leaders can 
condemn offensive speech, they must protect the right to engage in it. 
Dispute resolution principles encourage analysis of underlying interests and 
motivations, and when this happens with respect to those who advocate this third 
frame, some different, perhaps unexpected understandings of campus free speech 
conflict emerge.  Consider the case of a student who has been victimized by racial, 
ethnic, or religious epithets uttered by other students; this student appeals to campus 
leadership to punish the speakers.  Under the prevailing libertarian frame, the ran-
dom, occasional hateful utterance, while loathsome and offensive, receives First 
Amendment protection, and none of the traditionally recognized exceptions allow-
ing state regulation is applicable.  The libertarian frame explains that exceptions are 
needed for obscene and libelous speech, fighting words, and speech threatening im-
minent harm based upon the damage done to society when these kinds of speech 
are tolerated.  When this explanation is processed by an advocate of the third frame, 
several unwelcome messages are heard: loathsome epithets are not as harmful or 
repugnant as other types of speech prohibited under the established exceptions; ex-
tending protection to those who endure loathsome epithets and the like amounts to 
the coddling of “campus snowflakes” unprepared for the real world; psychological 
injuries inflicted by such speech are less authentic than the psychological injuries 
caused by obscene speech, fighting words, and imminent threats of harm; and these 
injuries are less important than the economic injuries caused by offensive speech to 
American business and corporate interests.  Adherents to this frame may observe 
that the business owner who endures libel and slander is not told, like the student 
who endures the racial epithets, to “suck it up” and counter the offensive speech 
with more speech.  Rather, the resources of the state are used to protect vested eco-
nomic interests from offensive speech, which stands in stark contradiction to the 
failure to protect the individual whose right to enjoy equal access to constitutional 
citizenship is under siege.  Thus, an advocate of the third frame will see the com-
peting libertarian frame as imposing a double standard that favors establishment 
interests.  The campus leader whose response to a student objecting to hateful 
speech is a succinct, unempathetic “this is what the law requires,” without any 
acknowledgement of the interests or the logic underlying the student’s request for 
protection of her dignity, will be less effective in dealing with the conflicts that 
                                                        
 47. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist 
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L. J. 431. 
 48. Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Constitutional Status of Unconstitutional Speech, 
48 VAND. L. REV. 349, 382 (1995). See also Ulrich Baer, What ‘Snowflakes’ Get Right About Free 
Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017) (“The idea of freedom of speech does not mean a blanket permission 
to say anything anybody thinks. It means balancing the inherent value of a given view with the obligation 
to ensure that other members of a given community can participate in discourse as fully recognized 
members of that community. Free-speech protections – not only but especially in universities, which aim 
to educate students in how to belong to various communities – should not mean that someone’s human-
ity, or their right to participate in political speech as political agents, can be freely attacked, demeaned 
or questioned.”). 
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accompany the collision of these alternative, competing frames of the First Amend-
ment’s content. 
VIII. A CONCLUDING THOUGHT 
It is not this Essay’s purpose to probe or attempt to reconcile the different ways 
of framing First Amendment jurisprudence with respect to campus discourse, nor is 
it to advocate in favor or against any of these frames.  Rather, this Essay suggests 
one single, relatively straightforward insight – that the constructs developed by and 
used in the field of dispute resolution provide useful tools for analyzing and under-
standing free speech conflict, and that campus leaders can benefit from reflecting 
on these constructs.  In addition, because the First Amendment does not apply to 
private universities, leaders at these kinds of institutions, working with their gov-
erning boards, have the option to choose which frame shall be used to define the 
rules of their campus communities.  Understanding the dispute resolution constructs 
discussed in this Essay will better prepare these campus leaders for participation in 
the discussions accompanying the processes through which these choices are made.  
For leaders in both public and private universities, active self-reflection about these 
constructs will help prepare the leaders to exercise their discretion effectually when 
responding to free speech conflict on campus. 
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